Abstract
Introduction
The increasing use of open, internet-based communications for business-to-business (B2B) interactions adds urgency to the requirements for security and regulation to safeguard the interests of participants. These requirements include: accountability for and acknowledgement of the actions of participants; and the monitoring of interactions for compliance with business contract. Accountability and acknowledgement can be achieved by the systematic maintenance of an irrefutable audit trail to render B2B interactions non-repudiable. Regulation entails the monitoring of interactions to ensure that messages exchanged are consistent with the business contracts that govern the interaction.
The above requirements are particularly important in high-value B2B relationships, such as in a virtual organisation (VO). In a VO a number of autonomous organisations collaborate to achieve some mutually beneficial goal. Each organisation requires that their interests are protected in the context of the VO. Specifically, that partner organisations comply with contracts governing the VO; that their own legitimate actions (such as delivery of work, commission of service) are recognised; and that partner organisations are accountable for their actions. This implies the recording of activity for audit and the monitoring of activity for compliance with the regulatory regime. Further, to protect the interests of well-behaved members of a VO, the interaction should be non-repudiable (no party should be able to deny their participation) and the auditing and monitoring functions must be fair (misbehaviour should not disadvantage well-behaved parties).
It is increasingly common to standardise B2B interactions in terms of message-exchange patterns. The work of the RosettaNet Consortium [1] is a case in point. RosettaNet define the externally observable aspects of a B2B interaction through a set of Partner Interface Processes (PIPs). PIPs standardise the XML-based business messages that should be exchanged between partners to execute some function (such as order processing). Figure 1 shows the de-A B 1. msg 2. ack 3. valid/invalid 4. ack
Figure 1. Business message delivery with acknowledgements
livery of a business message and associated acknowledgements in such an interaction. Typically, for each business message, there should be an immediate acknowledgement of receipt -indicating successful delivery of the message.
Eventually, a second acknowledgement indicates whether the business message is valid (or invalid) in the context of the given interaction. Finally, the validation message is acknowledged in return.
Validation of the original business message (performed at B) can be arbitrarily complex. For example, it may simply involve verification that a message is syntactically valid and in correct sequence with respect to a single PIP. Alternatively, a message may require validation with respect to more complex contractual conditions or with respect to local application state. Triggering validation at the level of business message delivery has the potential to allow specialization of an application to meet the constraints of different regulatory regimes. A PIP, or composition of PIPs, may specify the general form of a B2B process that is then validated at run-time in the context of a specific business relationship. Web services are increasingly used to enable B2B interactions of this kind. However, there is currently no systematic support to make the exchange of the business message and associated acknowledgements both fair and non-repudiable. For example, there is no systematic support to prevent a customer from denying that they submitted a purchase order and at the same time to prevent the supplier from denying its receipt.
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a flexible framework for fair, non-repudiable message delivery and its implementation using Web services technologies. The implementation comprises a set of services that are invoked at the middleware level and, therefore, enable the Web services developer to concentrate on business functions. Our middleware renders the exchange of business messages fair and non-repudiable. Arbitrarily complex, application-level validation is supported through the registration of message validators to validate messages upon receipt. The paper describes two fair exchange protocols that have been chosen for initial implementation. However, our framework is sufficiently flexible to adapt to different application requirements and, in particular, to execute different protocols.
Section 2 provides an overview of the underlying concepts of non-repudiation and fairness, and of our approach to achieving these properties for an interaction of the type described above. Section 3 provides a detailed discussion of the initial fair exchange protocols chosen. Their implementation is based on a trusted third party (TTP) delivery agent. The agent can either take on most of the responsibilities of evidence verification and storage and, thereby, simplify the tasks for its users; or greater responsibility can be transferred to the users to reduce the demands on the delivery agent. Section 4 describes the implementation based on Web service technologies. Section 5 discusses related work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Basic concepts and approach
In this section we introduce some basic concepts that will be used throughout the paper. We then provide an overview of the approach taken to render the interaction described in Section 1 both fair and non-repudiable.
Basic concepts
Non-repudiation is the inability to subsequently deny an action or event. It is one of the key properties of secure systems as defined in [2] . In the context of distributed systems, non-repudiation is applied to the sending and receiving of messages. For example, for the delivery of a message from A to B: (i) B may require non-repudiation of origin of the message (NRO) -irrefutable evidence that the message originated at A; and (ii) A may require non-repudiation of receipt of the message (NRR) -irrefutable evidence that B received the message Non-repudiation is usually achieved using public key cryptography. If A signs a message with their private key, B can confirm the origin of the message by verifying the signature using A's public key. Similarly, given B's signature on the message, A can confirm receipt by verifying the signature using B's public key.
Exchanging non-repudiation evidence is essential to be able to subsequently demonstrate what happened during an interaction. An additional requirement is that at the end of the interaction no well-behaved party is disadvantaged. For example, consider the situation where the sender provides proof of origin but does not obtain the corresponding proof of receipt. This is unfair because the receiver can choose to deny receipt of a message. Fairness can be achieved by executing a fair exchange protocol. Markowitch et al [3] provide the following definition of fairness: "... The communication channel's quality being fixed, at the end of the protocol run, either all involved parties obtain their expected items or none (even a part) of the information to be exchanged with respect to the missing items is received.".
Most practical fair non-repudiation protocols require the involvement of a TTP to some extent. The level of intervention can vary depending on the protocol and the requirements of the end users. Kremer et al [4] identify three main types of TTP: inline, online and offline. An inline TTP (sometimes called a delivery agent) is involved in transmission of each protocol message. An online TTP is involved in each session of a protocol but not in every message transmission. An offline TTP is involved in a protocol only in case of incorrect behaviour of a dishonest entity or in case of network failures.
Overview of approach
To illustrate our approach we take the business interaction described in Section 1 and make it fair and nonrepudiable. Figure 2 Figure 1 with the NRO appended. DA exchanges msg and NRO for NRR with B (before application-level validation of msg). Then DA provides NRR to A -equivalent to message 2 in Figure 1 . Subsequently, B performs application-level validation of msg (as in message 3 of Figure 1 ) and provides NRV to DA. The DA, in turn, provides NRV to A and provides acknowledgement of NRV to B. Note, the exact sequence of the exchange will be dictated by the actual protocol used and should not be inferred from Figure 2 . As shown in Figure 3 , our approach is to deploy interceptors that act on behalf of the end users in an interaction. An interceptor has two main functions: (i) to protect the interests of the party on whose behalf it acts by executing appropriate protocols and accessing appropriate services, including TTP services; and (ii) to abstract away the detail of the mechanisms used to render an interaction safe and reliable for its end user. In this case, the mechanism used is to communicate through a TTP -DA. It is the responsibility of the DA to ensure fairness and liveness for well-behaved parties in interactions that the DA supports. Further, the DA's fairness and liveness guarantees hold for well-behaved parties in spite of any misbehaviour by any other party involved in an interaction. Since the cooperation of misbehaving parties cannot be guaranteed, in extremis the DA will ensure that any disputes that arise can be resolved in favour of wellbehaved parties.
For an interaction of the type described in Section 1, the introduction of interceptors means that the end users, A and B, experience the message exchange shown in Figure 1 . However, the exchange that actually takes place is as shown in Figure 2 . That is, as far as possible, A and B are free to concentrate on application level concerns while their interaction is rendered fair and non-repudiable.
From DA's point of view there is no distinction between A and A's interceptor, or B and B's interceptor (similarly, for A with respect to B and B with respect to A). Therefore, we only distinguish between an end user and their interceptor when necessary -for example, when discussing the implementation.
Delivery-agent based fair exchange
This section discusses the first two fair exchange protocols we have chosen to implement. First we provide an overview of the chosen protocols and discuss the motivation behind the choice. Then we state protocol assumptions and notation. The section concludes with a detailed description of each protocol. In addition to a main protocol there are sub-protocols to support exception handling. Since the delivery agent is trusted, these sub-protocols can be used for timely, and fair, termination of a protocol despite noncooperation of one of the other participants in the main protocol.
Protocol overview
Coffey and Saidha developed a fair non-repudiation protocol utilising an in-line TTP [5] . This was later improved by Zhou and Gollman in [6] . The protocols presented here are derived from the improved protocol. Both protocols include modifications: (i) to provide A with proof of submission to DA; (ii) to support the non-repudiation of the extra validation message described in Section 2 (adding 3 protocol steps); and (iii) to support exception handling through execution of sub-protocols. The first protocol is a further modification to support light-weight end users. The second protocol uses a light-weight delivery agent and is closer to the original Coffey and Saidha protocol.
In the first protocol, the delivery agent is responsible for much of the evidence verification and for the long-term storage of evidence for audit. The end users only need to verify evidence produced by the delivery agent and, in conse-quence, only need access to the information necessary to verify a known third party's signature and credentials. This means that the end users may only require credential management at the level used by the typical Web browser (as opposed to access to the more comprehensive public key infrastructure required to verify evidence from all parties with whom they may interact). End user logging requirements are also reduced. Minimally, they only need to maintain the information necessary to link an interaction to the evidence held by the delivery agent (such as a protocol run identifier).
In the second protocol, the responsibilities for evidence verification and long-term storage are transferred to the end users, reducing the delivery agent responsibilities. In this case, the delivery agent may discard information after termination of a protocol run and need only sign the non-repudiation of submission evidence (as opposed to all non-repudiation tokens seen by the other participants). A lighter-weight delivery agent inevitably leads to increased direct end-user reliance on supporting public key infrastructure and to increased end-user responsibility for long-term storage of evidence.
Assumptions
We make the standard perfect cryptography assumptions [7] , including: (i) that message digests (secure hashes) are one-way, collision resistant; (ii) that it is computationally infeasible to predict the next bit of a secure pseudo-random sequence even with complete knowledge of the algorithmic or hardware generator and of all of the previous bits in the sequence; (iii) that digital signatures cannot be forged; and (iv) that encrypted data cannot be decrypted except with the appropriate decryption key. To support the assertion that a key used to sign evidence was not compromised at time of use, and for audit trail logs, signed evidence should be timestamped by a TTP time-stamping service [6] . For brevity, time-stamping is not shown in protocol descriptions.
The following assumptions are made with respect to well-behaved parties to a non-repudiable interaction:
• The communication channel between well-behaved parties provides eventual message delivery (there is a bounded number of temporary network and computer related failures).
• Each party has persistent storage for messages. More precisely, well-behaved parties will ensure that messages are available for as long as is necessary to meet their obligations to other parties (longer term storage may be required for their own purposes).
• Well-behaved parties only exchange messages that are well-constructed with respect to the protocol being executed. For example: messages exchanged are either tamper-resistant (encrypted), or tampering is detectable and well-behaved parties will cooperate to ensure a well-constructed message is eventually delivered.
To guarantee fairness, we make the same assumptions with respect to the DA as in existing fair exchange protocols, namely: (i) that the DA is well-behaved; (ii) that, given the perfect cryptography assumptions, the DA can detect the misbehaviour of other parties; and (iii) that the DA will ensure protocol resolution in favour of well-behaved parties.
Notation
In the protocols, participant A, wishes to send a business message, msg, to participant B. All communications between A and B take place through delivery agent DA. Table 1 Notation Description rn secure pseudo-random number h (x) secure hash of x id unique protocol run identifier i, j concatenation of items i and j
encryption of x with P 's public key V AL | IN V signifies msg validity or invalidity NV AL signifies msg not validated Table 1 . Notation for protocol elements provides the notation used for basic protocol elements. To simplify protocol descriptions, and without loss of generality, it is assumed that the signature scheme is recoverable. That is, if necessary, x (and any items that are concatenated to construct x) may be recovered from sig P (x) 1 . To allow verification of rn as a protocol authenticator, it is also assumed that id contains h (rn). Table 2 defines the nonrepudiation evidence exchanged during a protocol run. DA associates a termination state with each exchange. The state is SU CCEEDED if the exchange is successfully completed and ABORT ED if the exchange is cancelled.
Fair exchange for light-weight end users
This section first discusses normal execution to successful completion of the main protocol for light-weight end users. We then present abort and resolve sub-protocols for exception handling.
Non-repudiation token
DA's substitute NRV of msg Table 2 . Definition of non-repudiation tokens
Normal protocol execution
Normal execution of the main protocol is shown below, followed by a commentary on each step.
Step 1: A sends a business message (msg), a secure pseudo-random number (rn) and its non-repudiation of origin token (NRO A ) to DA. At this step, if DA finds that the id included in NRO A is not unique, an appropriate response will be generated to prompt A to restart the protocol with a newly generated id. Otherwise, the protocol will proceed to step 2. The rn provided by A is used in step 8 as the acknowledgement of receipt of B's NRV token. All items are encrypted to guarantee that B does not obtain the items before providing non-repudiation of receipt.
Step 2: DA provides proof of submission to A to signal willingness to proceed with protocol execution. This step may be executed in parallel with step 3.
Step 3: To enable B to construct NRR B : DA sends the id, the participant identifiers A and B (recovered from NRO A ) and a hash of msg to B.
Step 4: B responds with NRR B . It is safe for B to send the receipt to DA before obtaining msg because DA, as TTP, can and will provide msg in return. NRR B is encrypted to guarantee that A can only obtain the receipt if the exchange runs to some form of successful completion.
Step 5: DA sends NRR DA to A. This is DA's receipt for msg and assurance that it has received and verified NRR B . This step may be executed in parallel with step 6.
Step 6: DA sends msg and associated NRO DA to B.
Step 7: B performs application-level validation of msg. The outcome of this validation is signed along with id to form NRV B that is sent to DA.
Step 8: rn, hitherto known only to A and DA, is sent to B as acknowledgement of receipt for NRV B . This step may be executed in parallel with step 9.
Step 9: DA sends NRV DA to A -non-repudiation of the outcome of validation of msg.
At the end of execution of the main protocol, A has acquired the following evidence: NRS DA , NRR DA and NRV DA -non-repudiation of submission, receipt and validation of msg. In return, B has acquired: msg, NRO DA and rnthe business message with non-repudiation of origin and acknowledgement of validation of msg. DA has the complete set of evidence, including: NRO A , NRR B and NRV B . Fairness is guaranteed because DA controls the release of the evidence to A and B. Furthermore, DA's signature on the evidence provided to A and B: (i) serves as a guarantee that DA has seen, verified and will store the evidence for future reference; and (ii) reduces the verification work of A and B to that of verifying the signature and associated credentials of a well-known TTP.
If B does not wish to perform application-level validation of msg, then the protocol can terminate at step 6. In this case, at step 4, B sends DA both NRR B and a default NRV B token that confirms the validity of msg. At step 5, DA sends A both NRR DA and NRV DA . At step 6, DA sends rn to B with msg and NRO DA .
On successful completion of the main protocol, DA sets termination state to SU CCEEDED.
Exception handling
In exceptional circumstances A or B may request that DA terminate the main protocol before completion. Such requests typically occur because A or B is concerned about Apart from the signed request that initiates the resolve sub-protocol, the only significant difference to the abort sub-protocol is that execution of step 2.1 is triggered if either termination state is ABORT ED or the main protocol has not progressed beyond step 3.
Once the termination state of an exchange has been set (whether after execution of the main protocol or one of the above sub-protocols), DA will forever respond in the same way to any subsequent request to abort or resolve the identified exchange (with appropriate abort token or resolution evidence). DA also responds in the same way to any subsequent message of the main protocol. That is, once the termination state has been set, DA suspends the main protocol at lastStep.
Termination may also be triggered by the a priori indication of deadlines for the acknowledgements provided in the main protocol (NRS, NRR and NRV). In this case, in step 1 of the main protocol A can indicate deadline(s) for delivery that they wish to be observed (on a best effort basis). During protocol execution, DA determines locally whether a delivery deadline is achievable. If not, DA will pro-actively terminate the exchange and issue appropriate abort or resolve tokens to A and B depending on the state of the main protocol at the time of termination.
Fair exchange with light-weight delivery agent Normal protocol execution
The protocol for fair exchange with light-weight DA is:
This protocol is closer to the Coffey-Saidha protocol with the addition of steps 7 to 9 for NRV of msg. The difference between this protocol and the light-weight end user protocol is that A and B are now responsible for verification of each other's evidence and for its long-term storage. Thus, in steps 5, 6 and 9, DA relays the tokens provided by A and B rather than generating new signed tokens.
Exception handling
The abort and resolve sub-protocols are basically as defined in Section 3.4 except that the resolution evidence provided in steps 2.2 and 2.3 is now:
For successful termination before step 7, the DA provides NRV DA (as described in Section 3.4). For successful termination after step 6, DA provides NRV B (as opposed to NRV DA ). The abort token is identical to that defined in Section 3.4.
Fault tolerance in fair exchange
A fair exchange protocol is fault-tolerant if it ensures no loss of fairness to an honest participant even if the participant's node experiences failures of the assumed type. In other words, an honest user does not suffer a loss of fairness because of their node failure. This is not the case with most of the fair exchange protocols studied in the literature, including the ones presented here. Ezhilchelvan and Shrivastava [8] describe various approaches to preserving fairness in the presence of node crashes and recovery; application of these to the protocols presented here is left as a direction for future work.
Implementation based on Web services
In this section we present the Web services based implementation of a framework for non-repudiation protocol execution (WS-NRExchange). First we provide an overview of Web services and the standards used to support WSNRExchange. Then we provide a high-level view of a WS-NRExchange based non-repudiable interaction. Section 4.3 describes the generic interface to protocol execution and the associated message schema that underpin WSNRExchange.
The combination of an interceptor based approach and a generic interface to protocol execution allows the infrastructure to adapt to different application requirements, including the execution of different protocols, without disturbing application-level logic. For example, the infrastructure presented here could be used to execute protocols with inline, online or offline TTP.
To place the following discussion in context, Figure 
Overview of Web services and supporting standards
A Web service can be described, published, located and invoked over the Web. Web services are based on open standards and are designed to inter-operate independent of implementation platform. Web services typically communicate using the SOAP messaging protocol [9] . A SOAP message is an XML document that comprises a message envelope with a header and a body. The header contains message processing information. The body contains the application payload. The interface that a Web service exposes, in terms of messages that can be processed and operations that can be invoked, can be described using the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) [10] .
The WS-Security standard [11] covers the creation of self-protecting messages for Web services. WS-Security applies XML technologies, such as XML Signature [12] and XML Encryption [13] , to SOAP messages. XML Signature specifies how to attach signatures, and related information, to XML documents, or parts of documents, and related material. XML Encryption is the corresponding standard for encryption.
Digital Signature Service (DSS) and XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) are higher level specifications that use WS-Security. DSS specifies a service for the verification and the application of signatures to XML; and for trusted time-stamping of signed information. XKMS concerns public key life-cycle management. It specifies how to register, locate, verify and revoke the digital credentials that are associated with public keys. XKMS and DSS may be offered as TTP services to support secure Web service interactions, thereby reducing the security infrastructure requirements of users. Organisations may also provide a subset of the services in-house as part of their own security infrastructure. For example, an in-house DSS service can be used to apply corporate signatures to XML messages.
Reliable messaging (RM) specifies the message content, protocols and persistence requirements necessary for Web services to implement various forms of reliable message delivery. We require at least once message delivery between well-behaved parties. Currently, there are competing standards proposed for Web service reliable messaging: WSReliability [14] and WS-ReliableMessaging [15] . There is overlap between the two proposals and WS-NRExchange can adapt to both.
Our contribution is to provide the NRExchange Web service that uses the standards outlined above. Figure 5 shows the interactions between the various components and services that make up our implementation. DA, A and B each provide an NRExchange Web service that manages their participation in non-repudiation protocols. Each Web service exposes the same interface for protocol execution. At A and B this service is deployed as an interceptor that mediates Web service interactions that require non-repudiation. This interceptor may be co-located with the local application that uses it or may, for example, be part of a corporate firewall service. The end-users, A and B, may themselves be Web services or Web service clients or both. The NRExchange services access additional local services for signing evidence, message persistence and application-level validation. The signing service is required to apply signatures to the parts of messages that have not already been signed 2 (as dictated by the protocol being executed). This service may be an implementation of DSS or some other mechanism for obtaining private keys to apply signatures as defined by WS-Security. Persistence is required to meet fault tolerance requirements and also for audit. The NRExchange services also access trusted timestamping services and public key management services (for example, DSS and XKMS services provided by third parties). For protocols that use an inline TTP, trusted timestamps may optionally be applied by the DA Web service.
WS-NRExchange based interaction
As described in Section 4.3, a WSDL interface has been defined for the interaction between NRExchange services. The SOAP messages exchanged comply with the WS-Security specification.
The NRExchange Web service also provides a local interface to allow registration of application-specific listeners for message validation and other events. A message validation listener may trigger arbitrarily complex validation of a business message. If no validation listener is registered, then the NRExchange service assumes that a message is valid with respect to business contract. Messages that are found to be invalid with respect to contract are logged but are not passed to the target application for processing. Registration of event listeners allows notification of protocolrelated events. For example, an application can register to receive notification of zero or more of the acknowledgements generated by the protocols described in Section 3. Figure 6 is an extract of the WSDL of an NRExchange Web service that shows the operations that are exposed to other NRExchange services for protocol execution. 2 It is possible for signatures to have been applied at the application level, in which case the NRExchange service does not need to countersign. <wsdl:portType name="NRExchange"> <operation name="processMessage"> <input message="ProtocolMessage"/> </operation> <operation name="processRequest"> <input message="ProtocolMessage"/> <output message="ProtocolMessage"/> </operation> <operation name="abort"> <input message="ProtocolStateMessage"/> </operation> <operation name="resolve"> <input message="ProtocolStateMessage"/> </operation> <wsdl:operation name="getProtocolState"> <input message="GetProtocolStateMessage"/> </operation> <wsdl:operation name="setProtocolState"> <input message="ProtocolStateMessage"/> </operation> </wsdl:portType>
Generic NRExchange interface and message schema

Figure 6. Extract of NRExchange WSDL
NRExchange services use the processMessage operation to exchange non-repudiation protocol messages with each other. The sender provides a protocol message for the receiver to process according to a specified non-repudiation protocol. Message elements are defined in a related XML Schema. The schema is sufficiently general and extensible for the processMessage operation to be used to execute any protocol that participant services support. The processRequest convenience operation allows send and receipt of protocol messages as request/response pairs.
The abort and resolve operations are for pro-active termination (see Section 3.4). These operations are typically used by a DA to inform another participant service that an identified exchange has been aborted or resolved with the given termination state. Invocation of these operations may result in execution of a new sub-protocol using the protocol execution operations.
The getProtocolState operation is a request for information concerning the known state of a protocol run as viewed by the service on which the operation is invoked. This operation may lead to execution of a state request subprotocol to determine how much of the current state should be revealed to the invokee. The protocol state may be provided during execution of this sub-protocol or by invocation of the setProtocolState operation on the service that originally invoked the getProtocolState operation.
The SOAP binding for the NRExchange service specifies two types of message:
1. protocol messages that are exchanged during execution of a main protocol or of related sub-protocols using processMessage and, optionally, processRequest; and As shown in Figure 7 , protocol messages must have a NRExchangeProtocol header. This is an extensible container for non-repudiation protocol data items that are defined in the NRExchange XML schema or may be defined in derivations of that schema or in schemas that are specific to a given non-repudiation protocol. The NRExchange schema specifies that any NRExchangeProtocol header must have protocol name, runId and messageNumber attributes. The protocol name is a URI that serves to uniquely identify the protocol, or sub-protocol, being executed and may also provide access to protocol documentation including schema that specialise the NRExchange schema. The runId is a unique identifier that is normally generated from some base URI and a random digest (a hash of a secure pseudo-random number and other associated input). The inputs to runId generation can be specified using a RunIdGenerator element. The messageNumber is a positive, non-zero double value that corresponds to the step of the protocol being executed. Depending on the protocol being executed or the step of the protocol, the following optional items may be included in the NRExchangeProtocol header: a run sequence number; the purpose of the protocol message (NRR, NRO etc.); the participants in the protocol; the runIds of any related protocol or sub-protocol runs; and information related to acknowledgements and receipts required. The message body, if present, contains the application data originally intended to be conveyed from sender to receiver as the body of the business message. The interested reader is referred to our related technical report for examples of messages exchanged during a protocol run [16] .
Housekeeping Figure 8 . In addition to identifying the protocol and run to which a message relates, a ProtocolState element may include information such as: the protocol run status; if terminated, the termination state; and the message numbers of any messages seen by the recipient. Protocol messages may be provided as attachments to a protocol state message. Figure 9 presents the general form of a message participant's entitlement to information. Also, security tokens included in the WS-Security header may serve to assert entitlement to information.
Related work
In our earlier work [17] we described how component middleware (such as J2EE application server) can be enhanced to support non-repudiation. The work presented in this paper is a significant extension to provide fair, validated, non-repudiable message delivery in the sort of asynchronous and long-running interactions that Web services are intended to support.
The Universal Postal Union has proposed the Global Electronic Postmark [18] (EPM) standard. This is a TTP service for generation, verification, time-stamping and storage of non-repudiation evidence. It does not provide support for the fair exchange of evidence.
Wichert et al [19] represents an early implementation of a non-repudiation service that uses filters in CORBA to provide non-repudiable invocation on a remote object. However, their approach was asymmetric -the client provides the server with non-repudiation of origin of a request but there is no exchange to provide corresponding evidence to the client.
Various companies are beginning to offer XML firewall solutions that perform various security functions such as signing, encryption and verification of cryptographic information. Notably, DataPower [20] offer XML processing in hardware that can apply cryptography to XML documents at "wire-speed". Verisign [21] offer an organisational gateway service to secure SOAP-based message exchange. Earlier, Lee et al [22] proposed an interceptor-based solution that provided similar facilities. All of these approaches can offer non-repudiation of origin by applying signatures to outgoing messages. They are also capable of verifying signatures and security tokens attached to incoming messages. They are essentially providing a Wichert-type service for SOAP messaging. They do not provide systematic nonrepudiation of receipt and there is no support for fair exchange. Neither is there support for systematic binding of non-repudiation evidence to application-level message validation. The NRExchange service we have presented could make use of these solutions for its basic cryptographic and verification services.
There has been much work on fair exchange and fair non-repudiation, and on the formal verification of protocols. Kremer et al [4] summarise the state of the art and provide a useful classification of protocols according to types of fairness and the role of TTPs in protocols. There have also been contributions on the transformation of fair exchange to meet fault tolerance requirements [23, 8] . This body of work can be brought to bear on the choice of protocols that the NRExchange services use to meet application requirements.
The FIDES system [24] provides services, including TTP services, and an associated application for fair exchange of documents. Application clients submit documents to the FIDES system for fair exchange with partners who also have a FIDES client for verifying and receipting documents received. In effect FIDES offers a standalone service for fair exchange. Such a system could be built on our NRExchange middleware. Similarly, if the FIDES system were to expose appropriate service interfaces and if their protocol execution engines could be instrumented to trigger application-level validation, the NRExchange service could be implemented using FIDES services. Without such interfaces, it appears difficult to adapt the FIDES approach to arbitrary service interactions. Apart from FIDES, we know of no other work on service-based implementation of fair exchange. With respect to application-level validation of business messages, the work of Minsky et al on Law Governed Interaction (LGI) [25] represents one of the earliest attempts to provide coordination between autonomous organisations. Trusted agents act as mediators that comply with a global policy.
LGI does not address systematic non-repudiation, but does support automatic validation techniques. This is similar to work by colleagues [26] that aims to automate, as far as possible, the derivation and verification of the validation process from business contracts.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have developed an approach and a reference implementation to support fair non-repudiable interactions. We showed how an existing delivery agent based protocol could be augmented to render a common business message exchange non-repudiable. This involved the addition of extra steps for message validation. We then described how the protocol could be modified to facilitate a more light-weight delivery agent. In Section 4 we described our Web services based implementation. This involved a general overview of the architecture showing how our services interact with existing Web service standards and services. We then described our Web services interface to protocol execution.
Future work will provide end-to-end fair non-repudiation of application-level request/response message exchange. Essentially, the message delivery primitive will be used to provide fair exchange of both the request and the response message along with non-repudiation of the correlation between the application-level messages. This will be similar to the non-repudiable service invocation described in [17] but will apply in the Web services context and will operate for different request/response semantics (for example:
Proceedings of the 2005 Ninth IEEE International EDOC Enterprise Computing Conference (EDOC'05) asynchronous, deferred synchronous and synchronous). We also intend to use the NRExchange infrastructure to provide Web services based non-repudiable information sharing [27] .
Our implementation operates a layer above reliable messaging. However, there is duplication of effort between fair exchange and reliable messaging both in terms of acknowledgements generated and message persistence. We intend to investigate tighter integration of the two services. Our approach will be modular and configurable. Essentially, either the fair exchange service will provide reliable messaging directly (for greater performance) or, as now, it will rely on an existing standards-based implementation to provide a reliable channel.
We also intend to investigate systematic support for protocol development from verification and modelling through a derived implementation to deployment as part of the infrastructure described in this paper.
